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
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## Are Public-Led Arts Incubating Programs a Double-Edged Sword? A Case Study of the Arts Council Korea's Performing Arts Grant Program

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To cite this article: Hyesun Shin & InSul Kim (2019) Are Public-Led Arts Incubating Programs a Double-Edged Sword? A Case Study of the Arts Council Korea's Performing Arts Grant Program, The Journal of Arts Management, Law, and Society, 49:1, 89-103, DOI: 10.1080/10632921.2018.1473309

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/10632921.2018.1473309>



Published online: 14 Sep 2018.



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# Are Public-Led Arts Incubating Programs a Double-Edged Sword? A Case Study of the Arts Council Korea's Performing Arts Grant Program

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## ABSTRACT



A nation's cultural policy is derived from its political and governance history, and its past practices. Taking the genealogical traits of South Korean cultural policies into account, the authors examine the contributions and risks of a public-led arts incubator program. One of the Arts Council Korea's grant programs in the arts-incubating structure was involved with a public funding scandal of political intervention during the grant review process. Consequently, questions were raised about the current bureaucratic system for cultural policy. This article discusses the legitimacy of state intervention in the arts, and analyzes the case with relevant collected documents and interviews.

## KEYWORDS

Arm's length principle; Arts Council Korea (ARKO); cultural policy; direct public funding; government intervention

## Introduction

In September 2015, the Korean arts and culture sector underwent a period of confusion when a press report was published denouncing the censorship that had occurred during the Arts Council Korea's (ARKO) grant peer-review session (Newsroom, JTBC, September 9, 2015). The report unveiled a story in which the reviewers of one of ARKO's performing arts production grant programs, entitled Chang-jak-san-shil (CJSS), meaning "cradle of arts creation," had been clandestinely pressured to reject a theater production submitted by a well-recognized producer in the field. The primary reason for the attempt at censorship was that the producer had derogated a former president, Jung-hee Park, and his daughter, then-president Guen-hye Park, in one of his previous works. Despite this outside attempt to influence the peer review process, the grant reviewers did not succumb to the pressure, and the production was selected for the award. However, the producer decided to "voluntarily" give up the grant after being asked to do so by ARKO officers (JTBC 2015; Kyunghyang-Shinmoon 2015). Responses to this scandal included an announcement from the Seoul Theater Association on the dissolution of ARKO. This joint statement was issued by several cultural organizations, including the Writers Association of Korea, Cultural Action, the Cultural Policy Network of Korea, and others, and prompted scholarly discussions, a forum, and

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multiple publications (Cho 2015; Hankook-Ilbo 2015; Kyunghyang-Shinmoon 2015; Kim, M.-D. 2015; Kim, S.-Y. 2015; Lee 2016; Oh 2016; Rho 2015). Consequently, the illegitimate government intervention was investigated during the 2015 government audit hearings by the Education, Culture, Sports and Tourism Committee (ECSTC) of the Korean National Assembly. Requirements for the rectification of these issues were arranged for both ARKO and the Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism (MCST) (ECSTC 2016).

As exemplified in the previously mentioned case, public subsidies for the arts and their legitimacy are subjects of constant discussion in many countries, including debates on grant distributions and the degree of involvement of governments in cultural policy. Cultural policy, which is a part of overall public policy and the bureaucratic systems of states, pertains to government interests, political regimes, and public sentiment. Therefore, to more effectively support and distribute funding, countries are urged to develop their own cultural policy structures by adopting and adjusting suitable measurements. Previous studies on this subject seem to agree that countries take different paths in constructing their cultural policies, depending on their political and governance histories (Zimmer and Toepler 1999). Acknowledging the genealogical traits of a nation's current cultural policy, we can observe how diverse types of government subsidies for the arts are prone to different levels of government intervention (Frey 1999; Hillman-Chartrand and McCaughey 1989).

The cultural policy of South Korea has a relatively short history compared to other Western states. After the Korean War (1950–1953), the divided nation had to cope with internal and external wounds, such as the collapsed economy. The arts and culture sector was not a subject of priority on the nation's agenda. Korean cultural policy has developed since the 1990s, following the end of the authoritarian regimes under the military dictatorship of the mid-1980s (Kim 2010; Lee 2012). Until the mid-1980s, Korean cultural policy demonstrated key characteristics of the Engineer mode, where political standards are posited at the center of decision-making processes for direct funding. As Korean society became more democratic, cultural policy in South Korea transformed into the Architect mode, where government funding is a dominant source of support for the arts and culture sector, based on its centralized bureaucracy, as applied in France (Hillman-Chartrand and McCaughey 1989; Mulcahy 2000; Zimmer and Toepler 1999).

As one of ARKO's largest grant programs in terms of grant size, the CJSS is intended to foster the performing arts domain by adopting the concept of arts incubation with a multiple-phased review structure. Based on Essig's (2014) typology of arts incubation, the grant program was intended to provide artists and arts organizations with financial and other types of assistance to help develop new plays and productions, thereby enhancing their sustainability. In addition to the anticipated contributions, some detrimental risks exist due to the public (or bureaucratic) stance of the agent that is operating the program. Although public-led or, more precisely, state-run arts-incubating grant programs can encourage arts professionals to create new artwork by supporting them in all phases of production, arts productions remain vulnerable to potential bureaucratic intervention because they are subject to a multiple-phase review process while they are being created.

Considering both contexts of the institution and the arts-incubating program, this article provides insight into government intervention through direct funding in Korea by analyzing the CJSS case from institutional, program structural, and empirical aspects. By adopting an interpretivist perspective, we attempt to use the complexity of the CJSS case to understand the role of ARKO within the wider context of government funding for the arts in Korea. We used qualitative approaches to investigate the case, reviewing multiple sources, such as newspaper articles, government reports, and academic articles, and conducting interviews with the grantees and peer reviewers of the CJSS.

## Research design and methods

A case study serves to provide in-depth understanding of an event and its context. This research design is based on Yin's principle for conducting a case study by investigating one of ARKO's grant programs, the CJSS. According to Yin (1994), a case study methodology is suitable when the researcher seeks answers to how or why questions; when the researcher has little control over cases being studied; when an inquiry lies in "a contemporary phenomenon in a real-life context;" and when it is desirable to use various sources of evidence (13). With this as a framework, we attempted to gain a deeper understanding of the CJSS program in order to discern the historical and contextual causes that led to the recent scandal and disputes with ARKO, over which the authors had little control.

We also followed an interpretivist philosophical tradition within the realm of qualitative research. Interpretivism believes that reality is a social product interpreted by men as social actors according to their values and beliefs (Cavaye 1996). In this vein, interpretivist research tries to understand phenomena through approaching the meanings that informants assign to them (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991, 5). To systematically approach those constructed meanings, we collected data from multiple sources, including interviews with the CJSS grantees and peer reviewers, academic journals, newspaper articles, and government reports for document analysis. For the document analysis, we reviewed government official reports as well as ARKO's unpublished documents that are related to the history of the CJSS, from its primitive to its present state. Likewise, we collected and reviewed academic and newspaper articles that covered the late issues on the government interventions in the CJSS granting process during Park's administration, which seriously escalated from Fall 2015. The interviews were conducted from September to October 2015, and the research participants were the grantees ( $n=21$ ) and peer reviewers ( $n=7$ ) who were involved in the CJSS's FY 2015–2016.

Flyvbjerg (2006) points out two primary types of case selection: random selection and information-oriented selection. If the former serves for enabling generalization, the latter is for a significant event which may suggest certain findings or work as an exemplar to extend our knowledge about a given subject. We consider our case, the CJSS program, as an information-oriented selection that may illuminate the old but ongoing issue of the legitimacy of state intervention in the arts as a double-edged sword.

## Theoretical background

Does state intervention in the arts have negative effects? Conceivably, it involves dilemmas, rather than simply producing negative effects. Subsidization for arts productions has a long history in many societies in the East and West. For instance, a considerable number of arts productions that are cultural heritages were commissioned by the wealthy, religious powers, and political leaders. They were created to meet particular sponsor requirements. Consequently, little autonomy was granted to the artists in the creative process (Frey 1999; Zuidervaart 2011).

However, government, a bureaucratic system adopted in most nation-states, does not always rest on a one-way coercive, dominant relation. According to Foucault's concept of governmentality, to which the current notion of cultural policy owes considerably (Miller and Yúdice 2002), "[g]overning people, in the broad meaning of the word, [...] is always a versatile equilibrium [between what the governor wants and actions of the people], with complementarity and conflicts between techniques which assure coercion and processes through which the self is constructed or modified by himself" (Foucault 1993, 203–204). This implies that domination,<sup>1</sup> the asymmetrical power relationships between the governed and the governing, is not inherited by the bureaucratic system of government. Instead, a state of domination can be forged by "[t]echnologies of government account for the systematization, stabilization and regulation of power relationships" (Lemke 2002, 53). In this regard, how the state employs reasoning and how it administers the rationale as its code of conduct are perceived as crucial factors affecting the type of power relationship between the state and people. This insight thus provides an understanding of why we may witness different power relationships within or beyond a mode of government.

In cultural policy, some scholars have analyzed different types of states based on the level of a government's intervention in the arts and the diversity of funding sources which are grounded on each state's bureaucratic system, as well as its rationale for public funding of the arts (Frey 1999; Hillman-Chartrand and McCaughey 1989; Mulcahy 2000; Rushton 2000). Hillman-Chartrand and McCaughey (1989) categorize the government models in public policy for the arts based on which role the state plays in the related sector. They introduce four modes—"facilitator" (as in the United States), "patron" (as in the United Kingdom), "architect" (as in France), and "engineer" (as in the then-Soviet Union). However, as Hillman-Chartrand and McCaughey mention, while "these roles are mutually exclusive in theory, in practice most nations combine some or all of them" (53). To some extent, the South Korean government also utilizes the combined roles of the Architect and the Patron through the Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism (MCST) for setting up policy agendas as well as through the arm's length institution, ARKO, for distributing grants to the selected artists and arts organizations. However, when a government (agency) plays combined roles in practice, it may not result in the same consequences as when administering through separate government institutions, established for distinctive roles in cultural policy. Put more precisely, in the case of having both the central government and the arm's length agency, as in the UK and South Korea, if each institution's role does not depend on mutual respect, then institutional isomorphism can occur on the side holding dominant power (see DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Sung 2015).

According to Gray (2009), governments in many countries have exhibited a tendency to step away from directly investing in arts production, which tends to bring heavier burdens of accountability in the decision-making process. Becker (1982) identifies three forms of state intervention in artists' activities from "open support" to "censorship, and suppression" (180). In his view, the state has its own interests, and acts based on its survival and well-being. Therefore, based on the state's intention for its own good, public support, including grant distribution, can be provided or withheld for artists and arts organizations, by the use of coercive power in some cases. Such acts of intervention tend to influence the production, presentation, distribution, and existence of arts productions (Becker 1982).

Therefore, instead of direct involvement, the state chooses to employ intermediaries, specifically arts councils (Gray 2009, 580). The accountability required for direct giving is related to the dilemma of public funding for the arts—a risk of censorship. In truth, it is not a new question of how the state can judge what is good or bad art. Rushton (2000) articulates the issue by asking, "[I]s it good policy to place restrictions on the content of artworks which receive [public] funding?" (268). His inquiry is particularly relevant to the aspect that a state's intervention in the art production process carries the risk of limiting, manipulating, or exerting power over the artist's creativity and original motivation. In this regard, Frey (1999) cautions of the possibility of the detrimental effect of government subsidization on an artist's creative motivations. As he states, "[t]he more government support is *contingent on a particular performance*. Such immediate feedback is inimical to intrinsic motivation, and even more so to artistic innovation. Personal creativity needs time to develop, and is damaged if the support is closely connected with behavior" (79, emphasis in original).

In theory, public funding distributed by the government is one of the various forms of direct and indirect support. To secure their original creativity in the artwork, therefore, artists and arts organizations need to seek support from multiple sources to establish a balance among the interests of different funders. However, in practice, diverse funding options are not available in all nation-states. Rather, funding largely relies on the cultural bureaucratic system of the nation-state. Therefore, in a country like South Korea, which adopts and develops within a centralized bureaucracy, government subsidies can be a more dominant source of funding available for the arts and arts production than other private support options. In the following discussion, we shed light on the relationship between the central government and ARKO in terms of organizational history and budget.

### Contextual analysis: The Arts Council Korea

The current structure of the cultural bureaucratic system pertains to the past practice of cultural policy. This genealogical interpretation, conceived by Zimmer and Toepler (1999), is useful in interpreting ARKO's limited or weakening autonomy in its operations. With the establishment of ARKO in 2005, Korean cultural policy shifted by exercising the arm's length principle, as in the United Kingdom. In the South Korean case, although the bureaucracy adopted ARKO for allocating direct funding resources, its cultural policy could not leave the previous centralized bureaucracy behind in such a short



period of time. Such irony can be explained in part by Zimmer and Toepler's (1999) indication that the current mode of government support for the arts and culture can hardly be free from the old rituals practiced through former policies. Therefore, even after ARKO's inception, the government bureaucrats remained close to the field by working through the intermediate agency.


ARKO stemmed from the Korea Culture and Arts Foundation (KCAF), founded in 1973, based on the Korea Culture and Arts Promotion Act enacted the prior year.<sup>2</sup> In addition to direct supervision by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism (now the Ministry of Culture, Tourism and Sports, MCTS) (Lee 2012, 328), inactivity within the arts field evoked criticisms against the KCAF for its ineffectiveness in catering to the needs of arts professionals and organizations and for its lack of autonomy in its bureaucratic administration of the Culture and Arts Promotion Fund (hereafter referred to as "the Fund").<sup>3</sup> As the Roh administration's (2003–2008) policy direction pursued autonomy, decentralization, and participation (Lee 2004; Sung 2015), KCAF was accordingly restructured as an arts council with the enactment of the Korea Culture and Arts Promotion Act. As "a state-funded nonprofit organization" (ARKO n.d.), ARKO has continued to administer the Fund, which subsidizes artists and arts organizations.

Despite the original intention in establishing an arts council, ARKO and cultural bureaucrats have repeated the old ritual of having a hands-on relationship with the Ministry of Culture, Tourism and Sports, as witnessed during the KCAF period. According to Lee (2012), "in spite of the frequent rhetoric of 'private body,' 'autonomy,' and 'arm's length principle,' arts funding has been perceived as part of governmental affairs as it used to be" (330). In other words, a lack of institutional consensus between the MCTS and ARKO in implementing the arm's length principle has led to inconsistency in governance and grant making. With no consensus on institutionalizing the arm's length principle, ARKO could not help but reveal its vulnerability to political power and its ineffectiveness at safeguarding the arts field from the central government's interventions. Considering the fact that an administrative culture of the entire policy framework affects the determination of policy problems that may appear in the process of policy implementation (Gray 2009), this issue may have resulted from a mismatch between a policy strategy and the entire context.

As acknowledged, an essential rationale of having designated ARKO to operate and manage the Culture and Arts Promoting Fund rests on the arts council's quasi-government agency status. In theory, by having intermediary arts agencies work on cultural policy, a government can reduce its accountability on arts productions via public funding, and the arts communities can be insulated from direct government intervention, while benefiting from public subsidies (Gray 2010). However, as Hillman-Chartrand and McCaughey (1989) indicate, if a funding reservoir that arts councils or intermediate agencies rely on dries up, it is likely that the financial deficit will increase the demand for direct government involvement. Maintaining the financial sustainability or sound financial status of intermediary arts agencies is a crucial factor in ensuring that they effectively play their intended role.

In the case of ARKO, the Fund has been used as the major financial resource to manage the organization and operate its diverse programs. Since its creation, the Fund had been collected through multiple routes, including taxes on tickets for national





**Figure 1.** The core objectives of the CJSS grant program. Modified from Shin and Kim (2016, 120).

cultural venues (e.g., national palaces, royal tombs, and museums) and other arts venues, such as theaters, as well as investments, donations, lotteries, and government budgets (Kim 2010; Lee 2012). However, with the enforcement of the Framework Act on the Management of Charges in 2002, the collection of the Fund by charging taxes on ticket sales for arts and cultural venues was abolished on December 31, 2003 (ARKO 2013). The abolishment of the levy turned out to be a great loss for the Fund reservoir, because the revenue from taxes accounted for over 32 percent of the accumulative total income from 1973 to 2003 (ARKO 2013, 291). Since then, the annual revenue of the Fund has never recovered to its past rate, and has fallen short of meeting the amount of its annual expenditure.

To cope with the financial deficit ARKO has encountered, the MCST has stepped in, and decided to transfer 100 billion KRW (approximately 87 million USD) as an ad-hoc countermeasure, and 50 billion KRW (approximately 44 million USD) from the Tourism Promotion and Development Fund and the National Sports Promotion Fund, respectively (The Republic of Korea Government 2016, 16, 99). In effect, ARKO's lack of financial sustainability may have entrenched a hands-on relationship between the MCTS and ARKO. As Dowding (1995) has explained, "the power of members [of the network] is dependent upon the powers of other members given the relationship between them. Similarly, the types of relationship members have will be dependent upon their resources" (quoted in Taylor 1997, 448). Applying this insight to the cultural policy network in which the MCST and ARKO are located demonstrates that ARKO's insufficient income or ineffective management of the Fund may have put it in a more dependent and vulnerable position against external forces or the exercise of hierarchical control.

## Program structural analysis: The CJSS program

The launch of the CJSS grant program in 2008 (then operated as the Arts Creation Factory) was deemed sensational, because there were no public grants directly supporting the process of arts production at that time. Another key reason the program was welcomed by so many in the performing arts domain was the size of its funding compared to existing programs (Choi 2013). In FY 2015, the CJSS program budget recorded 11 billion KRW (approximately 96 million USD). Looking solely at the distributed grant amount, over 5.75 billion KRW (approximately 5 million USD) of the total budget had been awarded to selected performing arts productions. It is worth noting that the grant size varies from 10 million KRW (approximately 87,000 USD) to 300 million KRW (approximately 263,000 USD). Each grant size is determined by the competition phase (e.g., script reading at the first phase and showcasing at the second) and the performing arts discipline, each of which demand different sizes of support (ARKO 2015a, 2015b).

While pursuing the mission of discovering performing arts productions with potential, the CJSS has maintained three core values throughout the years of program operation: artistic excellence, sustainability, and incubating-based strategies (Figure 1).<sup>4</sup> These core values were identified by analyzing peer review criteria designed for different phases and performing arts disciplines of the CJSS. Three review criteria associated with artistic excellence commonly emerged: artistic quality, maturity and completion of the submitted artwork, and performance capability of the organization. Sustainability is comprised by the following review criteria: administrative capability of the arts organizations, popularity of the performance, and successful outcomes of the performance. The last value, the incubating-based strategies through phased support, is indicated by adequacy and feasibility of the production development plan, capacity of staging the newly created performing arts, and feasibility of the administrative plan and impact of the arts project (Shin and Kim 2016). The three core values of the CJSS suggest that the grant pursues artistic excellence by funding the multiple phases of the arts production process, and expects positive ripple effects from nurturing the ecology of the performing arts domain.

Figure 2 illustrates the CJSS grant's multiple-phased review and support process that consists of distinctive purposes and awards. As shown, each applicant should expect three or four phases of competition, depending on their discipline of arts. For example, if one applies to the CJSS grant for musical theater or classical music genre, then the applicant has to submit a musical score with their application; but for the theater discipline, a script is required with the application. For disciplines that do not require a script or a score, such as dance, applicants who are accepted for the paper review should expect to showcase their work, beginning from the second phase review. That is, except for the first phase, all applicants are supposed to go through the same steps to be eligible for the next stages, and acquire funding to showcase their artworks or perform on stage as an "Excellent Production."

## Narrative analysis: The participant view

This section covers the result of interviews with grantees ( $n=21$ ) and peer reviewers ( $n=7$ ) who were involved in the CJSS's FY 2015–2016. The purpose of this section is




Figure 2. Phase-based program structure of the CJSS. Modified from Lee et al. (2015).

to bring out the voices of people in the field based on two specific perspectives: beneficiaries (i.e., grantees) and experts (i.e., peer reviewers). Through this section, we wanted to achieve a more balanced and informed conclusion about the CJSS by including diverse perspectives on government subsidies for the arts. Not surprisingly, none of the interviewees explicitly addressed the concerns on political censorship nor the government interventions, which have aroused harsh criticism of the CJSS, as discussed earlier.

This was presumably due to the interviewees' favorable relations with the CJSS; however, we believe that it is important to reflect on those voices for two reasons. First, the focus of this study is not on the Park administration's (2013–2017) political censorship within the realm of cultural policy; rather, the focus is on the pros and cons of the CJSS itself as a case of government subsidies for the arts. Second, it is important to investigate the contributions, as well as the impediments, of a government's funding system through the eyes of actual beneficiaries to develop future strategies and rationales for public spending on the arts. Although one of the least desirable scenarios of government intervention is the execution of political censorship by the violation of the arm's length principle, we found it noteworthy to investigate the various perspectives, particularly that of the beneficiaries, to understand how they see and evaluate the CJSS.

According to the interviews with the CJSS grantees and peer reviewers, the arts incubating-based approach characterized by multiple phases of competitions and funding, and the relatively large grant size, appear to be the most appealing aspects of the CJSS for many applicants. These interviews also reveal that the CJSS participants believe that the size of the awards and the way in which they are distributed at different stages actually help artists better commit to arts production, be less distracted by the need to secure financial resources, and feel encouraged to pursue innovative, contemporary performing arts productions.

Prior to the CJSS, I used to work on small-scale music pieces. Due to the size of the CJSS fund and its step-by-step procedure, I could experiment more, and collaborate with various artists. And that allowed me to produce bigger and diverse types of works. Those traits are the most attractive aspects of the CJSS. (#7)<sup>5</sup>

Among the core objectives of the CJSS—namely, sustainability, artistic excellence, and incubating-based strategies—the grantees and the peer reviewers consider the most valuable contribution of the CJSS to be “artistic excellence” in terms of raising the rate of completion of artworks and the performing capacities of organizations. Although few peer reviewers expressed dissatisfaction with the degree of completion, all grantees strongly felt that their biggest achievement via the CJSS was improving artistic excellence by adding a new representative repertoire to their list. The CJSS's incubating-based strategies (i.e., a step-by-step survival system) also functioned as a sort of stimuli

to push their artistic effort and imagination further. As a result, they felt that the pride and bond of members were increased. The incubating-based strategies of the CJSS seemed to act as an organic inducer for producing the crucial elements that most arts organizations need to achieve success and growth in arts markets.

I could tell that the bond among our dancers grew stronger during the time when we worked together for the piece. The very idea that we were working together for moving up to the next level also allowed us to have a stronger sense of pride. I believe that the whole process was critical for achieving the level of completion of our own work since the system was based on step-by-step competition. (#3)

In terms of sustainability, some indirect effects of the CJSS were reported, such as increasing ticket sales or earning management skills that are heavily related to market survival and financial growth. Those indirect effects for sustainability are gaining audience trust and opportunities to perform abroad. The fact that the work is awarded by ARKO assured the uncertainty of artistic quality to some extent, as most performing arts are categorized as experienced goods.

I guess this kind of verification, bestowed by the ARKO, gives a certain power to perceive our work more respectfully in the eyes of others (#1).

We could earn some attention in Japan and later from China, and that was possible due to the CJSS. It certainly has some credit when you try to work with overseas production companies. (#18)

Regardless of these contributions, the interviewees also pointed to some impediments to fulfilling the objectives of the CJSS grant. The downsides of the grant program that were mentioned during the interviews pertained to the inconsistency of the program administration and the ineffectiveness of the panel review process.

It [the decisions of the peer reviews] makes me often wonder what the uppermost priority goal of this grant program is. It is like parallel. On one hand, some seem to emphasize the works that can contribute meaning toward the arts with deeper messages. Some, on the other hand, seem to stress the possibility of market success as a way of achieving sustainability as the most critical part in the reviewing process. (#16)

The CJSS beneficiaries also complained about the ad-hoc changes that occurred to the grant program, such as changes in submission deadlines and smaller grant sizes than what had been advertised. Such unexpected shifts occurred frequently during a grant cycle and confused the participants. Additionally, both grantees and panel reviewers raised concerns regarding the grant review process. One is that the review guidelines for the grants do not successfully reflect distinctive features of each arts discipline. Furthermore, regarding the panelists participating in the peer review, the interviewees argued that underqualified reviewers also participated in the decision-making process. For them, underqualified meant a lack of artistic knowledge and the inability to read musical scores. It is unclear whether ARKO purposefully included a non-artist or non-practitioner in the review committee to represent public opinion and prevent the review result from solely reflecting the preferences of professionals. Whatever the intention, fellow reviewers perceived the underqualified person's inclusion in the panel as inappropriate.

By examining the CJSS grant program, we have pointed to some signs that may have enticed the Ministry to intervene in the program administration. What unfolded here

leads us to wonder if such a hands-on relationship has continued between MCTS and ARKO, and also somehow affected ARKO's administration of the CJSS grant.

## Conclusion

By reviewing the CJSS program in terms of its meaning and chronological history and by analyzing the contextual circumstances in which ARKO is situated, we argue that ARKO's dependence on the MCTS opened the possibility for political intervention in the direct funding process. Examining the policy networks and governance of the Department of National Heritage in Britain, Taylor (1997) found that "fuzzy boundaries [between and within policy networks] enhance central steering" (460). Considering that the MCTS and ARKO belong to the same cultural policy network in Korea, with the central power given to the Ministry, Taylor's finding helps us understand how the blurry distinction between the roles of the Ministry and ARKO has weakened the latter's autonomy. Having identified the factors that may have led to the weakened status of ARKO today, we can also observe that the arm's length principle has not been fully adopted in practice, as the Korean government's old ritual of maintaining control has remained strong.

With regard to current debates over the legitimacy of direct public funding for arts production, the context within which the Korean cultural policy is situated gives the impression that it is somewhat politically engaged. It may be because the trace of military dictatorship, which had wielded political power over artistic expression through censorship, was maintained until the late 1980s. Having history as a backdrop, it might be legitimate to characterize the culture war that Korean cultural policy exhibits pertaining to the direct public funding as politically oriented. That is, the decision-making process of whether to subsidize arts production through public grants seems to easily become enmeshed with political perspectives in Korea. However, to define the culture war in the context of Korean cultural policy or the cultural politics context of public funding and related controversies, further investigations and discussions need to be undertaken. These include whether it is legitimate to conclude that public funds must not support a political demonstration (The Republic of Korea Government 2016), as well as what should fall within that category in the arts.

The case study of one of ARKO's grant programs, the CJSS, provides two implications for further research. First, more conceptual and theoretical inquiries are needed to better understand a mechanism of cultural policy development in a country with a history of strong intervention through government subsidies in the arts. This could be useful for us in understanding the patterns of why and how a government sometimes plays a role as a guardian but also acts as an agitator, prompting conflict and dispute in arts and cultural sectors. This leads to the second implication of the intricate dynamics of the relationship between the arts and the state, by looking at the roles the government plays in cultural policy development when the arts and cultural sectors lack social legitimacy and consensus, and thus rely heavily on the government for resources and support.

## Notes

1. Foucault identifies domination as a particular type of power relation. In his account, the notion of power is not equivalent with that of domination because “power relations do not always result in a removal of liberty or options available to individuals” (Lemke 2002, 53).
2. The Korea Culture and Arts Promotion Act provides a legal foundation for the definitions of the arts and culture, the creation of the Culture and Arts Promotion Fund, and the establishment of the Arts Council Korea. In that sense, this law sets distinctive boundaries around arts and culture and the cultural industry, which can be adopted for operating the Culture and Arts Promotion Fund.
3. The Culture and Arts Promotion Fund was also established based on the Korea Culture and Arts Promotion Act in 1972. According to the same law, the Fund must be created or collected through the following revenue resources: “contributions of the government,” “donations collected from individuals or corporations,” “proceeds accruing from the operation of the Culture and Arts Promotion Fund,” and “other earnings prescribed by Presidential Decree” (Korean National Law Information Center n.d.).
4. In its nascent stage, the MCTS has promoted the Arts Creation Factory (now the CJSS) grant as an arts-incubating program by demonstrating the program’s attributes, such as its multiple-phased structure from writing synopsis to its performance on stage (National Arts Center Association 2008; Kim 2012). However, although an arts incubator is defined as “a platform that empowers artists and organizations to implement their business and artistic ideas” (The Polish Art Inkubator 2013, quoted in Essig 2014, 171), the objective of the Arts Creation Factory program emphasizes that it is the artmaking process that should be nurtured, rather than the subject that is working on the creation. For that reason, we claim that conceiving the grant program as an arts incubating-based program would be more accurate (Shin and Kim 2016).
5. For detailed information about the research participants and the date of interviews, please refer to [Appendix A](#).

## Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank an anonymous peer-reviewer and Professor Soo Hee Lee for their insightful critiques and suggestions on an earlier version of this article. However, the authors are responsible for the final contents of it.

## Funding

This publication was partially funded by Chonnam National University (Grant number: 2017-2932).

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## Appendix A: Interviewees

Code	Gender	Occupational Title	Genre	Participant & Role in CJSS
1	Male	Artistic Director	Dance	FY 2016 Grantee
2	Female	President	Dance	FY 2016 Grantee
3	Female	Chair	Dance	FY 2016 Grantee
4	Female	Chair	Dance	FY 2016 Grantee
5	Female	President	Dance	FY 2016 Grantee
6	Male	Professor	Theater	FY 2016 Grantee
7	Male	President	Theater	FY 2016 Grantee
8	Male	Producer	Musical	FY 2016 Grantee
9	Male	Producer	Musical	FY 2016 Grantee
10	Male	Director	Musical	FY 2016 Grantee
11	Female	Director	Musical	FY 2016 Grantee
12	Male	Executive Director	Musical	FY 2016 Grantee
13	Male	Composer/Director	Music	FY 2016 Grantee
14	Female	CEO	Music	FY 2016 Grantee
15	Female	Executive Director	Music	FY 2016 Grantee
16	Male	Director	Music	FY 2016 Grantee
17	Male	Composer/Adjunct Professor	Opera	FY 2016 Grantee
18	Female	President	Musical	FY 2015 & 2016 Grantee
19	Male	President	Dance	FY 2015 & 2016 Grantee
20	Male	Chair	Dance	FY 2015 & 2016 Grantee
21	Female	Critic	Dance	FY 2015 & 2016 Grantee
22	Female	Critic	Dance	FY 2015 & 2016 Grantee
23	Male	Critic	Music	Peer Reviewer
24	Female	Critic	Musical	Peer Reviewer
25	Female	Producer	Theater	Peer Reviewer
26	Male	President	Music	Peer Reviewer
27	Male	Critic	Dance	Peer Reviewer
28	Female	Chair/Professor	Musical	Peer Reviewer